This article examines the emerging legal framework for algorithmic discrimination in hiring through the lens of Mobley v. Workday (2024), where a California court established that AI hiring platforms can be held liable as agents of employers under employment discrimination law. It identifies two distinct challenges in addressing algorithmic bias: first, establishing liability when employers delegate hiring decisions to third-party AI platforms, and second, evaluating discrimination claims when employers use in-house AI tools. Next, through analysis of precedential cases like Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California (2000) and Williams v. City of Montgomery (1984), it demonstrates how courts have historically extended liability to third parties exercising control over employment decisions. It concludes that while Mobley successfully addresses the first challenge by preventing employers from evading discrimination law through outsourcing, significant questions remain about proving negligence or disparate impact when employers deploy AI tools directly.

This essay examines the post-Dobbs legal landscape through the interdisciplinary frameworks of legal bionomics and biopolitics, arguing that the classical binary of “life versus choice” is increasingly inadequate for addressing the ethical and juridical complexities introduced by emerging reproductive technologies. By exploring libertarian-inspired theories of evictionism and departurism, the article considers how the decoupling of pregnancy termination from fetal death—facilitated by advances such as artificial wombs and fetal transfer—reconfigures foundational legal categories like viability, autonomy, and dependency. Far from endorsing any moral position, the analysis presents these philosophical models as conceptual instruments for anticipating how reproductive law might evolve within a transhumanist horizon. Situated within a broader inquiry into biopolitical governance and technological acceleration, the article contends that adaptive legal frameworks—responsive to both biomedical innovation and ethical pluralism—will be essential for navigating the regulatory challenges of a future in which gestation itself may be outsourced, automated, or redefined. In this context, abortion law becomes not merely a matter of constitutional interpretation but a site of ontological negotiation, demanding a jurisprudence capable of mediating between individual rights, emerging forms of life, and the expanding architecture of reproductive possibility.

During his second term, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis prioritized higher education, supporting various bills passed by the Republican supermajority to transform the state's universities and colleges. This legislation impacts 12 universities and over 400,000 students in the State University System, focusing on issues like faculty unions, post-tenure review, and addressing perceived liberal biases or “wokeness” in academic settings. His key legislation, the “Stop WOKE” Act, prohibits teaching that individuals are inherently racist, sexist or oppressive, rejects claims of privilege or oppression based on identity, and argues against the notion that one should feel guilt over historical injustices related to their identity. Additionally, FL SB 266 (2023) mandated the exclusion of identity politics in humanities courses while emphasizing materials from the “Western canon,” resulting in the removal of over half the humanities courses at the University of Florida. This article compiles and analyzes the individual and collective effects of DeSantis’s higher education efforts on legal precedents in the state and the legal effects of the legislature's grant of power over Florida universities and their students. Drawing on research from students and faculty, it examines how one governor has set a legal precedent for higher education as a political playground. In a national context, the current presidential administration mirrors Florida’s stance on higher education. For instance, President Trump has expressed intentions to cut funding for schools that teach critical race theory and has aligned himself with conservative educational groups like Moms for Liberty, which supports Florida’s new policies. Trump has vowed to “reclaim” higher education from what he views as radical influences, while Vice President JD Vance labeled universities, “the enemy.”

The right to strike should be recognised as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution. After briefly describing the global and Indian legal framework around the right to strike, the article holistically analyses the landmark case laws on the issue. This analysis supports the idea that the right to strike should be recognised as a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. So, the Supreme Court must revisit this issue and read the right to strike into Article 19(1)(c) in tandem with India’s international treaties and those of its other democratic counterparts.

This article examines the profound repression of Afghan women’s freedom of expression under the Taliban regime, which returned to power in August 2021. This repression includes but is not limited to the restriction of movement, the denial of education and employment opportunities, and the imposition of strict dress codes. The Taliban’s policies have systematically silenced women, depriving them of their fundamental rights to speak, engage in public life, and advocate for their freedoms. This analysis is rooted in international human rights law, focusing on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on Eliminating Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Rome Statute of the ICC and its provisions on freedom of expression and gender equality. The Taliban’s actions constitute severe violations of international law, warranting urgent global intervention to protect the rights of Afghan women.

This paper argues for the recognition of education as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by bridging the reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. While Rodriguez rejected the notion that education is a constitutionally protected right, the Court has consistently affirmed education’s essential role in sustaining democracy and enabling the exercise of other constitutional liberties. Drawing on historical evidence, substantive due process jurisprudence—particularly the frameworks in Washington v. Glucksberg and Obergefell v. Hodges—and key education cases such as Meyer, Pierce, Brown, Goss, and Plyler, the paper contends that education meets the criteria for fundamental rights recognition. It also explores a doctrinal path forward by treating education as a state-created property interest, grounded in Goss v. Lopez, thereby enabling judicial protection without requiring the Court to create new rights. Ultimately, the paper offers a doctrinally sound and historically rooted argument for constitutionally enshrining the right to education as essential to liberty, equality, and meaningful democratic participation.